

A thick black L-shaped frame is positioned on the left and right sides of the slide, framing the central text.

THE PYPY SANDBOX

Using the PyPy Sandbox to Explore Mobile Code
Sandboxing

Seth James Nielson



- B.S./M.S. Computer Science from Brigham Young University
- Ph.D. Computer Science from Rice University
- Past Experience: Software Engineer, Security Analyst
- Director of Advanced Research Projects at
The Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute
- Founder, Chief Scientist, Crimson Vista Inc.

The PyPy Sandbox (An Introduction)

- The PyPy Project
 - *Replacement for Cpython*
 - *Faster execution of most Python code*
 - *Current versions: 2.7.13 and 3.5.3*
- The PyPy Sandbox is a Secondary Feature
 - *Execution of **untrusted** Python scripts*




The Problem with Computers

- Computer processors do ***exactly*** what they're told
- They have no ability to decide if they ***should*** do what they're told
- What if they're told to do something ***harmful***?
- A lot of technology goes into figuring out what should be done
 - *Operating System*
 - *Anti-virus*
 - *Device permissions*


A Sandbox:

- The concept of a sandbox is an environment where destruction doesn't matter
- In practice, it is an interceptor between applications and the OS
- The interception layer enables:
 - *Policy Enforcement*
 - *“Sensor” Translations*
 - *“Command” Translations*

Untrusted
Application



SANDBOX




Operating System
Services
(Network, Filesystem, etc)

Policy Enforcement

- Most common use of a Sandbox
- Each incoming request to the operating system, ***and response***, can be inspected
 - *Requests and responses can be allowed, denied, or modified*
 - *Policy based on request/response type, parameters, state of the system, etc*
 - *Examples:*
 - Network Access (Deny, Same-Origin Policy)
 - File Access (Read Only, Write-to-Temp)
 - Even memory allocations

Sensor/Command Translations

- Policy is not just about allow/deny but rewrite/modify
- Any risky call (e.g., syscall) can be rewritten with safer parameter
 - *(Or a risky call could be re-written to a safer call with similar semantics)*
- But a sometimes overlooked Sandbox capability is lightweight virtualization
 - *I like to call this “Sensor” translations*
 - *The Sandbox can control what the application “sees”*
 - *For example, it can present a virtual filesystem*
 - *Or provide alternative API replacements that are more secure*



Untrusted Application

Virtual Filesystem


SANDBOX

Operating System Services
(Network, Filesystem, etc)

On-disk Filesystem

The PyPy Sandbox

- Creates a limited PyPy Interpreter
 - *No direct calls to the OS (system calls, etc)*
 - *Does not allow dynamic libraries, including compiled Python modules*
- Instead, a controlling process receives OS calls marshalled over a pipe
 - *This process provides the sandboxing and enforces security policies*
 - *For permitted calls, it performs the call itself and sends back the result*
 - *Or, it can modify the request and/or results*



Infinite Variety of Sandboxes

- Different controlling processes create different kinds of sandboxes
- Controlling process does not have to be Python
- The PyPy project provides a default controlling process called “pypy_interact.py”
 - *Can run a python “shell” or execute a script*
 - *Many OS subsystems completely disabled including network operations*
 - *Read only virtual file system*
 - /bin – virtual bin directory with pypy and a few required directories
 - /tmp – temp directory that potentially maps to a real directory
 - NOTE: the interpreter lives in the sandbox and executes the script from virtual /tmp!

```
$ mkdir my_sandbox_tmp
$ echo "this is a test" > my_sandbox_tmp/datafile.txt
$ ./pypy_interact.py --tmp=my_sandbox_tmp pypy3-c-sandbox
```

```
>>>> import os
>>>> os.listdir('/')
['dev', 'bin', 'tmp']
```

```
>>>> os.listdir('/tmp')
['datafile.txt']
```

```
>>>> f = open('/tmp/datafile.txt')
>>>> f.read()
'this is a test\n'
```

```
>>>> open('/tmp/newfile.txt', 'w+')
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/newfile.txt'
>>>> open('/tmp/datafile.txt', 'a+')
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
PermissionError: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted: '/tmp/datafile.txt'
```

Running an Untrusted Script

- Contents of “dangerous_script.py”

```
import os
print("Script Current Working Dir: {}".format(os.getcwd()))
print("Contents of root dir: {}".format(os.listdir('/')))
print("Try to delete /tmp dir with a system call.")
os.system('rm -rf /tmp')
```

```
$ ls my_sandbox_tmp/
```

```
dangerous_script.py  datafile.txt
```

```
./pypy_interact.py --tmp=my_sandbox_tmp pypy3-c-sandbox /tmp/dangerous_script.py
```

```
Script Current Working Dir: /tmp
```

```
Contents of root dir: ['bin', 'tmp', 'dev']
```

```
Try to delete /tmp dir with a system call.
```

```
Traceback (most recent call last):
```

```
  File "/tmp/dangerous_script.py", line 5, in <module>  
    os.system('rm -rf /tmp')
```

```
RuntimeError
```

Sample Sandboxing Functions

```
def do_ll_os__ll_os_write(self, fd, data):
    if fd == 1:
        self._output.write(data.decode())
        self._output.flush()
        return len(data)
    if fd == 2:
        self._error.write(data.decode())
        return len(data)
    raise OSError("trying to write to fd %d" % (fd,))
```

```
def do_ll_os__ll_os_read(self, fd, size):
    f = self.get_file(fd, throw=False)
    if f is None:
        return super().do_ll_os__ll_os_read(fd, size)
    else:
        if not (0 <= size <= (2**64)):
            raise OSError(errno.EINVAL, "invalid read size")
        # don't try to read more than 256KB at once here
        return f.read(min(size, 256*1024))
```


Using PyPy in the Classroom


- Network Security at Johns Hopkins University
- Student Labwork:
 - *Uses “Playground,” an education overlay network created by the Author*
 - *Students create their own version of TCP within Playground*
 - *Students create their own version of TLS within Playground*
 - *Students build mobile code applications on top of Playground using PyPy*
 - Parallel processing (e.g., Traveling Salesman)
 - Adapt pypy_interact to support new features (writing to filesystem)

Modifying pypy_interact

- Requires students to carefully think about sandbox policies and features
- For example, implementing write
 - *Requires students to understand virtual file system*
 - *Implement policy for when writes are allowed*
 - Specific directories
 - Maximum size
 - *Argument sanitation (e.g., “../../..” doesn’t escape the sandbox)*
- Another example: implementing network operations

Developing Bot Brains

- Advanced Network Security
- “CyberWar_EDU” project
 - *Gameboard with semi-autonomous “bots”*
 - *Students can (re-)program the bots with a Python brain script*
 - *Each brain scripts run inside a PyPy sandbox instance*
 - *Each brain needs to connect to*
 - The Game Board (over TCP)
 - The Student’s command and control server (over Playground’s network)



Sandbox “Brain” Extensions

- Extended pypy_interact.py to brain_interact.py
- Virtual file system supports two special virtual files:
 - *“game://” which opens a socket to the gameboard*
 - *“<playground-protocol>://<host>:<port>” which connects to C&C*
- Allows writing within the /tmp directory so students can re-program their brains!

Sample Modified Sandbox Functions

```
def do_ll_os__ll_os_open(self, name, flags, mode):
    if name.startswith(b"game://"):
        host, port = '127.0.0.1', 10013
        try:
            protocol = asyncio_interface.sandbox_connect(host, port)
        except Exception as e:
            print("Exception on game connection: {}".format(e))
            raise RuntimeError("Could not open connection to game because {}".format(str(e)))
        fd = self.allocate_fd(protocol, ProtocolSocketWrapper())
        self.sockets[fd] = True
    return fd
```

The “Null” Brain

```
import time
import os

def brainLoop():
    gameSocket = open("game://", "rb+")
    ccSocket = open("default://20181.0.1.1:5000", "rb+")

    while True:
        gameData = os.read(gameSocket.fileno(), 1024)
        ccData = os.read(ccSocket.fileno(), 1024)

        if gameData: os.write(ccSocket.fileno(), gameData)
        if ccData: os.write(gameSocket.fileno(), ccData)

        if not gameData and not ccData:
            time.sleep(.5) # sleep half a second every time there's no data

if __name__=="__main__":
    try:
        brainLoop()
    except Exception as e:
        print("Brain failed because {}".format(e))
```

Eventual Goal for Lab Work

- Students reprogram bots over the network
- Students attempt to reprogram other student bots to take them over
- Eventually, want a student sandbox within the bot sandbox
 - *Bot sandbox is to protect the game from student malicious code*
 - *Student sandbox is to protect bot against false reprogramming*
 - *Give students a chance to create “firmware” that detects bad “software”*

Quick Review

- PyPy sandbox
 - *Provides lightweight Python sandboxing*
 - *A modified interpreter has no system calls*
 - *Dangerous calls are processed by a controlling process*
 - *Policy enforces allow, deny, and modify*
 - *Modify can be used to create a virtual system*
- Students can experiment extensively and gain insight into mobile code execution

Final Notes

- PyPy sandbox is a prototype. It is not ready for production code
- The current PyPy sandbox is somewhat broken for 2.7, inoperable for 3.5
- For my class, I fixed 3.5. I plan to submit my changes to PyPy shortly
- I have discussed providing on-going maintenance with the PyPy team

Thank You!

- Feel free to ask questions!

- Links:

- *The PyPy project:* <http://pypy.org>
- *Playground code:* <https://github.com/CrimsonVista/Playground3>
- *CyberWar EDU code:* <https://github.com/CrimsonVista/cybersecurity-war>
- *Playground paper:* <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1132824>
- *JHUISI:* <https://isi.jhu.edu/>