

Systemic Risk & Vulnerability Analysis of Multi-Cloud Environments

Program Name: INSuRE+C

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Agenda

- Introduction
 - Problem Motivation
 - Industry Modeling
- Modeling Framework
- Risk Analysis & Explanation
- Attack Implementation
- Results & Future opportunities

This presentation was given at the 2023 National Cybersecurity Education Colloquium

Introduction

Problem Statement: Multi-Cloud application deployment has caused highly fragmented approach toward security, leading to a constant rise of new attack vectors and potential vulnerabilities.

Project Phases:

- 1) **Systemic Risk & Vulnerability Analysis of Multi-cloud Environments**
- 2) **Identify Novel Attacks Patterns & Risk Mitigation in Multi-cloud Environments**
- 3) **Develop & Evaluate Defensive Strategies to Secure Multi-cloud Environments**

Phase 1 - Systemic Risk & Vulnerability Analysis of Multi-cloud Environments

Architecture definition

3-tier multi-cloud architecture

Identify industry for modeling and analysis


Attack vector identification

Define Risk Analysis Methodology

STRIDE & DREAD to be used in conjunction with each other for full scoped analysis

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Multi-Cloud Architecture



Healthcare Industry Modeling and Analysis

- Risk assessment begins with Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
 - BIA requires organizational operations to determine impact
 - Enables defining basis of value of data
- BIA drives organizational risk analysis
- Defined architecture found extensively in healthcare industry
 - Either through internal development or acquisition, 90% of healthcare organizations plan on using multiple cloud service providers¹

¹ <https://www.hitinfrastructure.com/features/pros-cons-and-strategies-for-implementing-healthcare-multicloud/>

Attack Vector Categories

Identifying attack vectors that are unique to multi-cloud application deployments.

1. Architecture
2. API
3. Authentication
4. Automation
5. Difference in Management
6. Mismatch in Cyber Legislation

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STRIDE use in Risk Analysis and Mitigation

STRIDE Threat Modeling Methodology

Objective - Identify, categorize, and analyze attacks into 6 types of threats: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure (privacy breach or data leak), Denial of service, Elevation of privilege

Benefits - Proactive exercise in identifying threats and developing mitigations

Selection of Methodology - Used in all scenarios of threat modeling and risk analysis; one of the most commonly used threat modeling framework

DREAD Methodology

DREAD Risk Assessment Methodology

Objective - Quantitatively assess the severity of a cyberthreat using a scaled rating system that assigns numerical values to risk categories

Benefits – Very customizable methodology requiring extensive cybersecurity experience to ensure accurate analysis

Selection of Methodology - Focuses on impact and operability

Phase 2 - Perform risk & vulnerability analysis

Risk analysis

Application of STRIDE and DREAD to threat vectors identified in Phase 1

Risk mitigation

Utilizing MITRE ATT&CK Framework to support mitigation definition

Research and design simulation environment

Cloud providers and possible applications

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Architecture Threat Risk Analysis

Risk Score calculated from DREAD model:

$\text{avg_damage} = (\text{Legal} + \text{Reputation} + \text{Productivity}) / 3$

$\text{threat_probability} = (\text{Reproducibility}, \text{Exploitability}, \text{Affected Users}, \text{Discoverability})$

DREAD Risk Score = (avg_damage) + Σ threat_attributes

Overall Threat Rating from DREAD Risk Score

- **Critical (40–50):** Critical vulnerability; address immediately.
- **High (25–39):** Severe vulnerability; consider for review and resolution soon.
- **Medium (11–24):** Moderate risk; review after addressing severe and critical risks.
- **Low (1–10):** Low risk to infrastructure and data.

High Risk Attack Vectors – Risk Analysis Results

Description of Threat	STRIDE Framework Category	Total Risk Score	Damage			Threat Attributes			
			Legal Damage	Reputation Damage	Productivity Damage	Reproducibility	Exploitability	Affected Users	Discoverability
Architecture: CVEs	ALL	44.00	0	9	9	9	10	10	9
Architecture: DoS attacks	Denial of Service	42.67	0	10	10	8	8	10	10
Automation : Data poisoning	Tampering with Data	34.33	0	4	6	10	10	8	3
Authentication : Man-in-the-Middle	Information Disclosure	32.67	0	9	5	7	9	10	2
API : Malformed packets	Denial of Service	32.00	0	6	9	8	7	3	9
Architecture: Differing Encryption Offerings and Capabilities	Information Disclosure	30.33	0	6	7	7	8	4	7
Authentication : Substitution attack	Denial of Service	29.33	0	7	9	10	10	2	2
API : Privilege Elevation	Elevation of Privilege	28.00	0	9	6	8	10	3	2
Automation : Dynamic changes to config causing inconsistency	Denial of Service	27.33	0	5	8	5	8	7	3
Difference in Management: Auto-Scaling	Denial of Service	25.67	0	8	9	6	5	7	2
Authentication : Session hijacking	Spoofing Identity	25.67	4	6	4	7	8	1	5
Architecture: VPN Infiltration	Information Disclosure	25.33	0	8	5	6	9	2	4

High Risk Attack Vectors – Countermeasures and mitigations

Description of Threat	STRIDE Framework Category	Total Risk Score	Countermeasures	MITRE ATT&CK Mitigation
Architecture: CVEs	ALL	44.00	Patch Management - System Hardening	Patch
Architecture: DoS attacks	Denial of Service	42.67	WAF w/DDoS mitigation	Filter network traffic
Automation : Data poisoning	Tampering with Data	34.33	ICAM - Data Encryption - Secrets Management	Filter network traffic, IPS
Authentication : Man-in-the-Middle	Information Disclosure	32.67	Secrets Management - DNSsec	Static network config
API : Malformed packets	Denial of Service	32.00	API security & encryption	Monitoring
Architecture: Differing Encryption Offerings and Capabilities	Information Disclosure	30.33	ITIL - Change Management - Secrets Management	N/A
Authentication : Substitution attack	Denial of Service	29.33	Secure Block-cypher - timestamp	Audit, PAM, Cert Mgmt Monitoring, Audit GPO, PAM, User Acct mgmt
API : Privilege Elevation	Elevation of Privilege	28.00	PAM - least privilege	
Automation : Dynamic changes to config causing inconsistency	Denial of Service	27.33	SOAR Configuration Management - ITIL	N/A
Difference in Management: Auto-Scaling	Denial of Service	25.67	ITIL - Event Management	N/A
Authentication : Session hijacking	Spoofing Identity	25.67	TLS encryption on all sessions & MFA	MFA, delete persistent cookies
Architecture: VPN Infiltration	Information Disclosure	25.33	ICAM-MFA, Network segmentation	Network segmentation, MFA

Phase 3 - Develop & Evaluate Defensive Strategies to Secure Multi-cloud Environments

Build of test environment

Define scoped attack methodologies

Authentication

Execute attack


Implement mitigation

Retest attack identifying attack hinderances

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Test Env Architecture

- Utilizing Azure & AWS
- Collapse Front-end and application server
- Exposed UI and DB API
- Separate identity control systems



Attack Execution on Authentication

- Privilege Escalation

- Gain illegal/illicit access to a system through the elevation of user privilege about the assign authorization level. This can be obtained through the exploitation of a system bug, misconfiguration, or inadequate access controls.

- Session Hijacking

- Attackers use session cookies that have been stolen from a user's computer to impersonate the session/user gaining access to protected data and systems.

Final Conclusions

- Multi-cloud deployments of applications continues to grow and a source of vulnerability
- Vulnerabilities in multi-cloud is similar to single cloud with a few exceptions
 - Multi-cloud adds **COMPLEXITY** to the security
 - Security **PRIORITIES** can change in multi-cloud because of unique exposed vulnerabilities

Future Opportunities

- Multi-cloud security direction and research opportunities
 - Recurring mitigation across the attack vectors
 - Change management
 - Enabling coordination of configuration and changes
 - Centralized management
 - Further research
 - Unified management of multi-cloud configuration
 - Automated mitigation implementation across cloud providers

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Q&A